CRIMINAL OFFENSES

(720 ILCS 5/) Criminal Code of 1961.


(720 ILCS 5/Tit. I heading)
TITLE I. GENERAL PROVISIONS


(720 ILCS 5/Art. 1 heading)
ARTICLE 1. TITLE AND CONSTRUCTION OF ACT;
STATE JURISDICTION

(720 ILCS 5/1‑1) (from Ch. 38, par. 1‑1)
Sec. 1‑1. Short title.
This Act shall be known and may be cited as the "Criminal Code of 1961".
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)

(720 ILCS 5/1‑2) (from Ch. 38, par. 1‑2)
Sec. 1‑2. General purposes. The provisions of this Code shall be construed in accordance with the general purposes hereof, to:
(a) Forbid and prevent the commission of offenses;
(b) Define adequately the act and mental state which constitute each offense, and limit the condemnation of conduct as criminal when it is without fault;
(c) Prescribe penalties which are proportionate to the seriousness of offenses and which permit recognition of differences in rehabilitation possibilities among individual offenders;
(d) Prevent arbitrary or oppressive treatment of persons accused or convicted of offenses.
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)

(720 ILCS 5/1‑3) (from Ch. 38, par. 1‑3)
Sec. 1‑3. Applicability of common law. No conduct constitutes an offense unless it is described as an offense in this Code or in another statute of this State. However, this provision does not affect the power of a court to punish for contempt or to employ any sanction authorized by law for the enforcement of an order or civil judgment.
(Source: P.A. 79‑1360.)

(720 ILCS 5/1‑4) (from Ch. 38, par. 1‑4)
Sec. 1‑4. Civil remedies preserved.
This Code does not bar, suspend, or otherwise affect any right or liability to damages, penalty, forfeiture, or other remedy authorized by law to be recovered or enforced in a civil action, for any conduct which this Code makes punishable; and the civil injury is not merged in the offense.
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)

(720 ILCS 5/1‑5) (from Ch. 38, par. 1‑5)
Sec. 1‑5. State criminal jurisdiction.
(a) A person is subject to prosecution in this State for an offense which he commits, while either within or outside the State, by his own conduct or that of another for which he is legally accountable, if:
(1) the offense is committed either wholly or partly

within the State; or
(2) the conduct outside the State constitutes an

attempt to commit an offense within the State; or
(3) the conduct outside the State constitutes a

conspiracy to commit an offense within the State, and an act in furtherance of the conspiracy occurs in the State; or
(4) the conduct within the State constitutes an

attempt, solicitation or conspiracy to commit in another jurisdiction an offense under the laws of both this State and such other jurisdiction.
(b) An offense is committed partly within this State, if either the conduct which is an element of the offense, or the result which is such an element, occurs within the State. In a prosecution pursuant to paragraph (3) of subsection (a) of Section 9‑1, the attempt or commission of a forcible felony other than second degree murder within this State is conduct which is an element of the offense for which a person is subject to prosecution in this State. In homicide, the "result" is either the physical contact which causes death, or the death itself; and if the body of a homicide victim is found within the State, the death is presumed to have occurred within the State.
(c) An offense which is based on an omission to perform a duty imposed by the law of this State is committed within the State, regardless of the location of the offender at the time of the omission.
(Source: P.A. 91‑357, eff. 7‑29‑99.)

(720 ILCS 5/1‑6) (from Ch. 38, par. 1‑6)
Sec. 1‑6. Place of trial.
(a) Generally.
Criminal actions shall be tried in the county where the offense was committed, except as otherwise provided by law. The State is not required to prove during trial that the alleged offense occurred in any particular county in this State. When a defendant contests the place of trial under this Section, all proceedings regarding this issue shall be conducted under Section 114‑1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963. All objections of improper place of trial are waived by a defendant unless made before trial.
(b) Assailant and Victim in Different Counties.
If a person committing an offense upon the person of another is located in one county and his victim is located in another county at the time of the commission of the offense, trial may be had in either of said counties.
(c) Death and Cause of Death in Different Places or Undetermined.
If cause of death is inflicted in one county and death ensues in another county, the offender may be tried in either county. If neither the county in which the cause of death was inflicted nor the county in which death ensued are known before trial, the offender may be tried in the county where the body was found.
(d) Offense Commenced Outside the State.
If the commission of an offense commenced outside the State is consummated within this State, the offender shall be tried in the county where the offense is consummated.
(e) Offenses Committed in Bordering Navigable Waters.
If an offense is committed on any of the navigable waters bordering on this State, the offender may be tried in any county adjacent to such navigable water.
(f) Offenses Committed while in Transit.
If an offense is committed upon any railroad car, vehicle, watercraft or aircraft passing within this State, and it cannot readily be determined in which county the offense was committed, the offender may be tried in any county through which such railroad car, vehicle, watercraft or aircraft has passed.
(g) Theft.
A person who commits theft of property may be tried in any county in which he exerted control over such property.
(h) Bigamy.
A person who commits the offense of bigamy may be tried in any county where the bigamous marriage or bigamous cohabitation has occurred.
(i) Kidnaping.
A person who commits the offense of kidnaping may be tried in any county in which his victim has traveled or has been confined during the course of the offense.
(j) Pandering.
A person who commits the offense of pandering may be tried in any county in which the prostitution was practiced or in any county in which any act in furtherance of the offense shall have been committed.
(k) Treason.
A person who commits the offense of treason may be tried in any county.
(l) Criminal Defamation.
If criminal defamation is spoken, printed or written in one county and is received or circulated in another or other counties, the offender shall be tried in the county where the defamation is spoken, printed or written. If the defamation is spoken, printed or written outside this state, or the offender resides outside this state, the offender may be tried in any county in this state in which the defamation was circulated or received.
(m) Inchoate Offenses.
A person who commits an inchoate offense may be tried in any county in which any act which is an element of the offense, including the agreement in conspiracy, is committed.
(n) Accountability for Conduct of Another.
Where a person in one county solicits, aids, abets, agrees, or attempts to aid another in the planning or commission of an offense in another county, he may be tried for the offense in either county.
(o) Child Abduction.
A person who commits the offense of child abduction may be tried in any county in which his victim has traveled, been detained, concealed or removed to during the course of the offense. Notwithstanding the foregoing, unless for good cause shown, the preferred place of trial shall be the county of the residence of the lawful custodian.
(p) A person who commits the offense of narcotics racketeering may be tried in any county where cannabis or a controlled substance which is the basis for the charge of narcotics racketeering was used; acquired; transferred or distributed to, from or through; or any county where any act was performed to further the use; acquisition, transfer or distribution of said cannabis or controlled substance; any money, property, property interest, or any other asset generated by narcotics activities was acquired, used, sold, transferred or distributed to, from or through; or, any enterprise interest obtained as a result of narcotics racketeering was acquired, used, transferred or distributed to, from or through, or where any activity was conducted by the enterprise or any conduct to further the interests of such an enterprise.
(q) A person who commits the offense of money laundering may be tried in any county where any part of a financial transaction in criminally derived property took place or in any county where any money or monetary instrument which is the basis for the offense was acquired, used, sold, transferred or distributed to, from or through.
(r) A person who commits the offense of cannabis trafficking or controlled substance trafficking may be tried in any county.
(s) A person who commits the offense of online sale of stolen property, online theft by deception, or electronic fencing may be tried in any county where any one or more elements of the offense took place, regardless of whether the element of the offense was the result of acts by the accused, the victim or by another person, and regardless of whether the defendant was ever physically present within the boundaries of the county.
(t) A person who commits the offense of identity theft or aggravated identity theft may be tried in any one of the following counties in which: (1) the offense occurred; (2) the information used to commit the offense was illegally used; or (3) the victim resides.
If a person is charged with more than one violation of identity theft or aggravated identity theft and those violations may be tried in more than one county, any of those counties is a proper venue for all of the violations.
(Source: P.A. 94‑51, eff. 1‑1‑06; 94‑179, eff. 7‑12‑05; 95‑331, eff. 8‑21‑07.)

(720 ILCS 5/1‑8) (from Ch. 38, par. 1‑8)
Sec. 1‑8. Order of protection; status. Whenever relief sought under this Code is based on allegations of domestic violence, as defined in the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986, the court, before granting relief, shall determine whether any order of protection has previously been entered in the instant proceeding or any other proceeding in which any party, or a child of any party, or both, if relevant, has been designated as either a respondent or a protected person.
(Source: P.A. 87‑743.)


(720 ILCS 5/Art. 2 heading)
ARTICLE 2. GENERAL DEFINITIONS

(720 ILCS 5/2‑0.5) (was 720 ILCS 5/2‑.5)
Sec. 2‑0.5. Definitions. For the purposes of this Code, the words and phrases described in this Article have the meanings designated in this Article, except when a particular context clearly requires a different meaning.
(Source: P.A. 95‑331, eff. 8‑21‑07.)

(720 ILCS 5/2‑1) (from Ch. 38, par. 2‑1)
Sec. 2‑1. "Acquittal".
"Acquittal" means a verdict or finding of not guilty of an offense, rendered by a legally constituted jury or by a court of competent jurisdiction authorized to try the case without a jury.
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)

(720 ILCS 5/2‑2) (from Ch. 38, par. 2‑2)
Sec. 2‑2. "Act".
"Act" includes a failure or omission to take action.
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)

(720 ILCS 5/2‑3) (from Ch. 38, par. 2‑3)
Sec. 2‑3. "Another".
"Another" means a person or persons as defined in this Code other than the offender.
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)

(720 ILCS 5/2‑3.5)
Sec. 2‑3.5. "Community policing volunteer" means a person who is summoned or directed by a peace officer or any person actively participating in a community policing program and who is engaged in lawful conduct intended to assist any unit of government in enforcing any criminal or civil law. For the purpose of this Section, "community policing program" means any plan, system or strategy established by and conducted under the auspices of a law enforcement agency in which citizens participate with and are guided by the law enforcement agency and work with members of that agency to reduce or prevent crime within a defined geographic area.
(Source: P.A. 90‑651, eff. 1‑1‑99.)

(720 ILCS 5/2‑3.6)
Sec. 2‑3.6. "Armed with a firearm". Except as otherwise provided in a specific Section, a person is considered "armed with a firearm" when he or she carries on or about his or her person or is otherwise armed with a firearm.
(Source: P.A. 91‑404, eff. 1‑1‑00.)

(720 ILCS 5/2‑4) (from Ch. 38, par. 2‑4)
Sec. 2‑4. "Conduct".
"Conduct" means an act or a series of acts, and the accompanying mental state.
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)

(720 ILCS 5/2‑5) (from Ch. 38, par. 2‑5)
Sec. 2‑5. "Conviction".
"Conviction" means a judgment of conviction or sentence entered upon a plea of guilty or upon a verdict or finding of guilty of an offense, rendered by a legally constituted jury or by a court of competent jurisdiction authorized to try the case without a jury.
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)

(720 ILCS 5/2‑6) (from Ch. 38, par. 2‑6)
Sec. 2‑6. "Dwelling". (a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) of this Section, "dwelling" means a building or portion thereof, a tent, a vehicle, or other enclosed space which is used or intended for use as a human habitation, home or residence.
(b) For the purposes of Section 19‑3 of this Code, "dwelling" means a house, apartment, mobile home, trailer, or other living quarters in which at the time of the alleged offense the owners or occupants actually reside or in their absence intend within a reasonable period of time to reside.
(Source: P.A. 84‑1289.)

(720 ILCS 5/2‑6.5)
Sec. 2‑6.5. Emergency medical technician.
"Emergency medical technician‑ambulance", "emergency medical technician‑intermediate", and "emergency medical technician‑paramedic" have the meanings ascribed to them in the Emergency Medical Services (EMS) Systems Act.
(Source: P.A. 88‑433.)

(720 ILCS 5/2‑6.6)
Sec. 2‑6.6. Emergency management worker.
"Emergency management worker" shall include the following:
(a) any person, paid or unpaid, who is a member of a

local or county emergency services and disaster agency as defined by the Illinois Emergency Management Agency Act, or who is an employee of the Illinois Emergency Management Agency or the Federal Emergency Management Agency;
(b) any employee or volunteer of the American Red

Cross;
(c) any employee of a federal, State, county, or

local government agency assisting an emergency services and disaster agency, the Illinois Emergency Management Agency, or the Federal Emergency Management Agency through mutual aid or as otherwise requested or directed in time of disaster or emergency; and
(d) any person volunteering or directed to assist an

emergency services and disaster agency, the Illinois Emergency Management Agency, or the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
(Source: P.A. 94‑243, eff. 1‑1‑06; 94‑323, eff. 1‑1‑06; 95‑331, eff. 8‑21‑07.)

(720 ILCS 5/2‑7) (from Ch. 38, par. 2‑7)
Sec. 2‑7. "Felony".
"Felony" means an offense for which a sentence to death or to a term of imprisonment in a penitentiary for one year or more is provided.
(Source: P.A. 77‑2638.)

(720 ILCS 5/2‑7.1)
Sec. 2‑7.1. "Firearm" and "firearm ammunition". "Firearm" and "firearm ammunition" have the meanings ascribed to them in Section 1.1 of the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act.
(Source: P.A. 91‑544, eff. 1‑1‑00.)

(720 ILCS 5/2‑7.5)
Sec. 2‑7.5. "Firearm". Except as otherwise provided in a specific Section, "firearm" has the meaning ascribed to it in Section 1.1 of the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act.
(Source: P.A. 95‑331, eff. 8‑21‑07.)

(720 ILCS 5/2‑8) (from Ch. 38, par. 2‑8)
Sec. 2‑8. "Forcible felony". "Forcible felony" means treason, first degree murder, second degree murder, predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, aggravated criminal sexual assault, criminal sexual assault, robbery, burglary, residential burglary, aggravated arson, arson, aggravated kidnaping, kidnaping, aggravated battery resulting in great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement and any other felony which involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against any individual.
(Source: P.A. 88‑277; 89‑428, eff. 12‑13‑95; 89‑462, eff. 5‑29‑96.)

(720 ILCS 5/2‑9) (from Ch. 38, par. 2‑9)
Sec. 2‑9. "Included offense".
"Included offense" means an offense which
(a) Is established by proof of the same or less than all of the facts or a less culpable mental state (or both), than that which is required to establish the commission of the offense charged, or
(b) Consists of an attempt to commit the offense charged or an offense included therein.
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)

(720 ILCS 5/2‑10) (from Ch. 38, par. 2‑10)
Sec. 2‑10. "Includes".
"Includes" or "including" means comprehending among other particulars, without limiting the generality of the foregoing word or phrase.
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)

(720 ILCS 5/2‑10.1) (from Ch. 38, par. 2‑10.1)
Sec. 2‑10.1. "Severely or profoundly mentally retarded person" means a person (i) whose intelligence quotient does not exceed 40 or (ii) whose intelligence quotient does not exceed 55 and who suffers from significant mental illness to the extent that the person's ability to exercise rational judgment is impaired. In any proceeding in which the defendant is charged with committing a violation of Section 10‑2, 10‑5, 11‑15.1, 11‑19.1, 11‑19.2, 11‑20.1, 12‑4.3, 12‑14, or 12‑16 of this Code against a victim who is alleged to be a severely or profoundly mentally retarded person, any findings concerning the victim's status as a severely or profoundly mentally retarded person, made by a court after a judicial admission hearing concerning the victim under Articles V and VI of Chapter 4 of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code shall be admissible.
(Source: P.A. 92‑434, eff. 1‑1‑02.)

(720 ILCS 5/2‑10.2)
Sec. 2‑10.2. Laser or laser device. "Laser" or "laser device" means any small or hand‑held battery powered device which converts incident electromagnetic radiation of mixed frequencies to one or more discrete frequencies of highly amplified and coherent visible radiation or light. Proof that a particular device casts a small red dot or other similar small and discrete image or small and discrete visual signal upon a target surface at least 15 feet away creates a rebuttable presumption that the device is a laser. Flashlights and similar lamps, lanterns, lights, and penlights are not laser devices.
(Source: P.A. 91‑672, eff. 1‑1‑00.)

(720 ILCS 5/2‑10.3)
Sec. 2‑10.3. Laser gunsight. "Laser gunsight" means any battery powered laser device manufactured to function as a firearm aiming device or sold as a firearm aiming device.
(Source: P.A. 91‑672, eff. 1‑1‑00.)

(720 ILCS 5/2‑11) (from Ch. 38, par. 2‑11)
Sec. 2‑11. "Misdemeanor".
"Misdemeanor" means any offense for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment in other than a penitentiary for less than one year may be imposed.
(Source: P. A. 77‑2638.)

(720 ILCS 5/2‑12) (from Ch. 38, par. 2‑12)
Sec. 2‑12. "Offense".
"Offense" means a violation of any penal statute of this State.
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)

(720 ILCS 5/2‑13) (from Ch. 38, par. 2‑13)
Sec. 2‑13. "Peace officer". "Peace officer" means (i) any person who by virtue of his office or public employment is vested by law with a duty to maintain public order or to make arrests for offenses, whether that duty extends to all offenses or is limited to specific offenses, or (ii) any person who, by statute, is granted and authorized to exercise powers similar to those conferred upon any peace officer employed by a law enforcement agency of this State.
For purposes of Sections concerning unlawful use of weapons, for the purposes of assisting an Illinois peace officer in an arrest, or when the commission of any offense under Illinois law is directly observed by the person, and statutes involving the false personation of a peace officer, false personation of a peace officer while carrying a deadly weapon, and aggravated false personation of a peace officer, then officers, agents, or employees of the federal government commissioned by federal statute to make arrests for violations of federal criminal laws shall be considered "peace officers" under this Code, including, but not limited to all criminal investigators of:
(1) the United States Department of Justice, the

Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Agency and the Department of Immigration and Naturalization;
(2) the United States Department of the Treasury, the

Secret Service, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and the Customs Service;
(3) the United States Internal Revenue Service;
(4) the United States General Services Administration;
(5) the United States Postal Service; and
(6) all United States Marshals or Deputy United

States Marshals whose duties involve the enforcement of federal criminal laws.
(Source: P.A. 94‑730, eff. 4‑17‑06; 94‑846, eff. 1‑1‑07; 95‑24, eff. 1‑1‑08; 95‑331, eff. 8‑21‑07.)

(720 ILCS 5/2‑14) (from Ch. 38, par. 2‑14)
Sec. 2‑14. "Penal institution".
"Penal institution" means a penitentiary, state farm, reformatory, prison, jail, house of correction, or other institution for the incarceration or custody of persons under sentence for offenses or awaiting trial or sentence for offenses.
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)

(720 ILCS 5/2‑15) (from Ch. 38, par. 2‑15)
Sec. 2‑15. "Person".
"Person" means an individual, public or private corporation, government, partnership, or unincorporated association.
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)

(720 ILCS 5/2‑15.5)
Sec. 2‑15.5. "Personally discharged a firearm". A person is considered to have "personally discharged a firearm" when he or she, while armed with a firearm, knowingly and intentionally fires a firearm causing the ammunition projectile to be forcefully expelled from the firearm.
(Source: P.A. 91‑404, eff. 1‑1‑00.)

(720 ILCS 5/2‑15a) (from Ch. 38, par. 2‑15a)
Sec. 2‑15a. "Physically handicapped person". "Physically handicapped person" means a person who suffers from a permanent and disabling physical characteristic, resulting from disease, injury, functional disorder, or congenital condition.
(Source: P.A. 85‑691.)

(720 ILCS 5/2‑15b)
Sec. 2‑15b. "Place of worship" means a church, synagogue, mosque, temple, or other building, structure, or place used primarily for religious worship and includes the grounds of a place of worship.
(Source: P.A. 91‑360, eff. 7‑29‑99.)

(720 ILCS 5/2‑16) (from Ch. 38, par. 2‑16)
Sec. 2‑16. "Prosecution".
"Prosecution" means all legal proceedings by which a person's liability for an offense is determined, commencing with the return of the indictment or the issuance of the information, and including the final disposition of the case upon appeal.
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)

(720 ILCS 5/2‑17) (from Ch. 38, par. 2‑17)
Sec. 2‑17. "Public employee".
"Public employee" means a person, other than a public officer, who is authorized to perform any official function on behalf of, and is paid by, the State or any of its political subdivisions.
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)

(720 ILCS 5/2‑18) (from Ch. 38, par. 2‑18)
Sec. 2‑18. "Public officer".
"Public officer" means a person who is elected to office pursuant to statute, or who is appointed to an office which is established, and the qualifications and duties of which are prescribed, by statute, to discharge a public duty for the State or any of its political subdivisions.
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)

(720 ILCS 5/2‑19) (from Ch. 38, par. 2‑19)
Sec. 2‑19. "Reasonable belief".
"Reasonable belief" or "reasonably believes" means that the person concerned, acting as a reasonable man, believes that the described facts exist.
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)

(720 ILCS 5/2‑19.5)
Sec. 2‑19.5. "School" means a public, private, or parochial elementary or secondary school, community college, college, or university and includes the grounds of a school.
(Source: P.A. 91‑360, eff. 7‑29‑99.)

(720 ILCS 5/2‑20) (from Ch. 38, par. 2‑20)
Sec. 2‑20. "Solicit".
"Solicit" or "solicitation" means to command, authorize, urge, incite, request, or advise another to commit an offense.
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)

(720 ILCS 5/2‑21) (from Ch. 38, par. 2‑21)
Sec. 2‑21. "State".
"State" or "this State" means the State of Illinois, and all land and water in respect to which the State of Illinois has either exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction, and the air space above such land and water. "Other state" means any state or territory of the United States, the District of Columbia and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)

(720 ILCS 5/2‑22) (from Ch. 38, par. 2‑22)
Sec. 2‑22. "Statute".
"Statute" means the Constitution or an Act of the General Assembly of this State.
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)


(720 ILCS 5/Art. 3 heading)
ARTICLE 3. RIGHTS OF DEFENDANT

(720 ILCS 5/3‑1) (from Ch. 38, par. 3‑1)
Sec. 3‑1. Presumption of innocence and proof of guilt.
Every person is presumed innocent until proved guilty. No person shall be convicted of any offense unless his guilt thereof is proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)

(720 ILCS 5/3‑2) (from Ch. 38, par. 3‑2)
Sec. 3‑2. Affirmative defense.
(a) "Affirmative defense" means that unless the State's evidence raises the issue involving the alleged defense, the defendant, to raise the issue, must present some evidence thereon.
(b) If the issue involved in an affirmative defense, other than insanity, is raised then the State must sustain the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as to that issue together with all the other elements of the offense. If the affirmative defense of insanity is raised, the defendant bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence his insanity at the time of the offense.
(Source: P.A. 89‑404, eff. 8‑20‑95; 90‑593, eff. 6‑19‑98.)

(720 ILCS 5/3‑3) (from Ch. 38, par. 3‑3)
Sec. 3‑3. Multiple prosecutions for same act.
(a) When the same conduct of a defendant may establish the commission of more than one offense, the defendant may be prosecuted for each such offense.
(b) If the several offenses are known to the proper prosecuting officer at the time of commencing the prosecution and are within the jurisdiction of a single court, they must be prosecuted in a single prosecution, except as provided in Subsection (c), if they are based on the same act.
(c) When 2 or more offenses are charged as required by Subsection (b), the court in the interest of justice may order that one or more of such charges shall be tried separately.
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)

(720 ILCS 5/3‑4) (from Ch. 38, par. 3‑4)
Sec. 3‑4. Effect of former prosecution.
(a) A prosecution is barred if the defendant was formerly prosecuted for the same offense, based upon the same facts, if such former prosecution:
(1) Resulted in either a conviction or an acquittal or in a determination that the evidence was insufficient to warrant a conviction; or
(2) Was terminated by a final order or judgment, even if entered before trial, which required a determination inconsistent with any fact or legal proposition necessary to a conviction in the subsequent prosecution; or
(3) Was terminated improperly after the jury was impaneled and sworn or, in a trial before a court without a jury, after the first witness was sworn but before findings were rendered by the trier of facts, or after a plea of guilty was accepted by the court.
A conviction of an included offense is an acquittal of the offense charged.
(b) A prosecution is barred if the defendant was formerly prosecuted for a different offense, or for the same offense based upon different facts, if such former prosecution:
(1) Resulted in either a conviction or an acquittal, and the subsequent prosecution is for an offense of which the defendant could have been convicted on the former prosecution; or was for an offense with which the defendant should have been charged on the former prosecution, as provided in Section 3‑3 of this Code (unless the court ordered a separate trial of such charge); or was for an offense which involves the same conduct, unless each prosecution requires proof of a fact not required on the other prosecution, or the offense was not consummated when the former trial began; or
(2) Was terminated by a final order or judgment, even if entered before trial, which required a determination inconsistent with any fact necessary to a conviction in the subsequent prosecution; or
(3) Was terminated improperly under the circumstances stated in Subsection (a), and the subsequent prosecution is for an offense of which the defendant could have been convicted if the former prosecution had not been terminated improperly.
(c) A prosecution is barred if the defendant was formerly prosecuted in a District Court of the United States or in a sister State for an offense which is within the concurrent jurisdiction of this State, if such former prosecution:
(1) Resulted in either a conviction or an acquittal, and the subsequent prosecution is for the same conduct, unless each prosecution requires proof of a fact not required in the other prosecution, or the offense was not consummated when the former trial began; or
(2) Was terminated by a final order or judgment, even if entered before trial, which required a determination inconsistent with any fact necessary to a conviction in the prosecution in this State.
(d) However, a prosecution is not barred within the meaning of this Section 3‑4 if the former prosecution:
(1) Was before a court which lacked jurisdiction over the defendant or the offense; or
(2) Was procured by the defendant without the knowledge of the proper prosecuting officer, and with the purpose of avoiding the sentence which otherwise might be imposed; or if subsequent proceedings resulted in the invalidation, setting aside, reversal, or vacating of the conviction, unless the defendant was thereby adjudged not guilty.
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)

(720 ILCS 5/3‑5) (from Ch. 38, par. 3‑5)
Sec. 3‑5. General Limitations.
(a) A prosecution for: (1) first degree murder, attempt to commit first degree murder, second degree murder, involuntary manslaughter, reckless homicide, leaving the scene of a motor vehicle accident involving death or personal injuries under Section 11‑401 of the Illinois Vehicle Code, failing to give information and render aid under Section 11‑403 of the Illinois Vehicle Code, concealment of homicidal death, treason, arson, aggravated arson, forgery, or (2) any offense involving sexual conduct or sexual penetration as defined by Section 12‑12 of this Code in which the DNA profile of the offender is obtained and entered into a DNA database within 10 years after the commission of the offense and the identity of the offender is unknown after a diligent investigation by law enforcement authorities, may be commenced at any time. Clause (2) of this subsection (a) applies if either: (i) the victim reported the offense to law enforcement authorities within 2 years after the commission of the offense unless a longer period for reporting the offense to law enforcement authorities is provided in Section 3‑6 or (ii) the victim is murdered during the course of the offense or within 2 years after the commission of the offense.
(b) Unless the statute describing the offense provides otherwise, or the period of limitation is extended by Section 3‑6, a prosecution for any offense not designated in Subsection (a) must be commenced within 3 years after the commission of the offense if it is a felony, or within one year and 6 months after its commission if it is a misdemeanor.
(Source: P.A. 93‑834, eff. 7‑29‑04; 94‑487, eff. 11‑9‑05; 94‑683, eff. 11‑9‑05.)

(720 ILCS 5/3‑6) (from Ch. 38, par. 3‑6)
Sec. 3‑6. Extended limitations. The period within which a prosecution must be commenced under the provisions of Section 3‑5 or other applicable statute is extended under the following conditions:
(a) A prosecution for theft involving a breach of a fiduciary obligation to the aggrieved person may be commenced as follows:
(1) If the aggrieved person is a minor or a person

under legal disability, then during the minority or legal disability or within one year after the termination thereof.
(2) In any other instance, within one year after the

discovery of the offense by an aggrieved person, or by a person who has legal capacity to represent an aggrieved person or has a legal duty to report the offense, and is not himself or herself a party to the offense; or in the absence of such discovery, within one year after the proper prosecuting officer becomes aware of the offense. However, in no such case is the period of limitation so extended more than 3 years beyond the expiration of the period otherwise applicable.
(b) A prosecution for any offense based upon misconduct in office by a public officer or employee may be commenced within one year after discovery of the offense by a person having a legal duty to report such offense, or in the absence of such discovery, within one year after the proper prosecuting officer becomes aware of the offense. However, in no such case is the period of limitation so extended more than 3 years beyond the expiration of the period otherwise applicable.
(c) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (a) of Section 3‑5 of this Code and subdivision (i) or (j) of this Section, a prosecution for any offense involving sexual conduct or sexual penetration, as defined in Section 12‑12 of this Code, where the victim and defendant are family members, as defined in Section 12‑12 of this Code, may be commenced within one year of the victim attaining the age of 18 years.
(d) A prosecution for child pornography, indecent solicitation of a child, soliciting for a juvenile prostitute, juvenile pimping or exploitation of a child may be commenced within one year of the victim attaining the age of 18 years. However, in no such case shall the time period for prosecution expire sooner than 3 years after the commission of the offense. When the victim is under 18 years of age, a prosecution for criminal sexual abuse may be commenced within one year of the victim attaining the age of 18 years. However, in no such case shall the time period for prosecution expire sooner than 3 years after the commission of the offense.
(e) Except as otherwise provided in subdivision (j), a prosecution for any offense involving sexual conduct or sexual penetration, as defined in Section 12‑12 of this Code, where the defendant was within a professional or fiduciary relationship or a purported professional or fiduciary relationship with the victim at the time of the commission of the offense may be commenced within one year after the discovery of the offense by the victim.
(f) A prosecution for any offense set forth in Section 44 of the "Environmental Protection Act", approved June 29, 1970, as amended, may be commenced within 5 years after the discovery of such an offense by a person or agency having the legal duty to report the offense or in the absence of such discovery, within 5 years after the proper prosecuting officer becomes aware of the offense.
(f‑5) A prosecution for any offense set forth in Section 16G‑15 or 16G‑20 of this Code may be commenced within 5 years after the discovery of the offense by the victim of that offense.
(g) (Blank).
(h) (Blank).
(i) Except as otherwise provided in subdivision (j), a prosecution for criminal sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual assault, or aggravated criminal sexual abuse may be commenced within 10 years of the commission of the offense if the victim reported the offense to law enforcement authorities within 3 years after the commission of the offense.
Nothing in this subdivision (i) shall be construed to shorten a period within which a prosecution must be commenced under any other provision of this Section.
(j) When the victim is under 18 years of age at the time of the offense, a prosecution for criminal sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual assault, predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, or aggravated criminal sexual abuse or a prosecution for failure of a person who is required to report an alleged or suspected commission of any of these offenses under the Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act may be commenced within 20 years after the child victim attains 18 years of age.
Nothing in this subdivision (j) shall be construed to shorten a period within which a prosecution must be commenced under any other provision of this Section.
(k) A prosecution for theft involving real property exceeding $100,000 in value under Section 16‑1, identity theft under Section 16G‑15, aggravated identity theft under Section 16G‑20, or any offense set forth in Article 16H may be commenced within 7 years of the last act committed in furtherance of the crime.
(Source: P.A. 94‑253, eff. 1‑1‑06; 94‑990, eff. 1‑1‑07; 95‑548, eff. 8‑30‑07.)

(720 ILCS 5/3‑7) (from Ch. 38, par. 3‑7)
Sec. 3‑7. Periods excluded from limitation. The period within which a prosecution must be commenced does not include any period in which:
(a) The defendant is not usually and publicly resident within this State; or
(b) The defendant is a public officer and the offense charged is theft of public funds while in public office; or
(c) A prosecution is pending against the defendant for the same conduct, even if the indictment or information which commences the prosecution is quashed or the proceedings thereon are set aside, or are reversed on appeal; or
(d) A proceeding or an appeal from a proceeding relating to the quashing or enforcement of a Grand Jury subpoena issued in connection with an investigation of a violation of a criminal law of this State is pending. However, the period within which a prosecution must be commenced includes any period in which the State brings a proceeding or an appeal from a proceeding specified in this subsection (d); or
(e) A material witness is placed on active military duty or leave. In this subsection (e), "material witness" includes, but is not limited to, the arresting officer, occurrence witness, or the alleged victim of the offense; or
(f) The victim of unlawful force or threat of imminent bodily harm to obtain information or a confession is incarcerated, and the victim's incarceration, in whole or in part, is a consequence of the unlawful force or threats.
(Source: P.A. 93‑417, eff. 8‑5‑03; 94‑1113, eff. 1‑1‑08.)

(720 ILCS 5/3‑8) (from Ch. 38, par. 3‑8)
Sec. 3‑8. Limitation on offense based on series of acts. When an offense is based on a series of acts performed at different times, the period of limitation prescribed by this Article starts at the time when the last such act is committed.
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)


(720 ILCS 5/Tit. II heading)
TITLE II. PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY


(720 ILCS 5/Art. 4 heading)
ARTICLE 4. CRIMINAL ACT AND MENTAL STATE

(720 ILCS 5/4‑1) (from Ch. 38, par. 4‑1)
Sec. 4‑1. Voluntary act.
A material element of every offense is a voluntary act, which includes an omission to perform a duty which the law imposes on the offender and which he is physically capable of performing.
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)

(720 ILCS 5/4‑2) (from Ch. 38, par. 4‑2)
Sec. 4‑2. Possession as voluntary act.
Possession is a voluntary act if the offender knowingly procured or received the thing possessed, or was aware of his control thereof for a sufficient time to have been able to terminate his possession.
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)

(720 ILCS 5/4‑3) (from Ch. 38, par. 4‑3)
Sec. 4‑3. Mental state.
(a) A person is not guilty of an offense, other than an offense which involves absolute liability, unless, with respect to each element described by the statute defining the offense, he acts while having one of the mental states described in Sections 4‑‑4 through 4‑‑7.
(b) If the statute defining an offense prescribed a particular mental state with respect to the offense as a whole, without distinguishing among the elements thereof, the prescribed mental state applies to each such element. If the statute does not prescribe a particular mental state applicable to an element of an offense (other than an offense which involves absolute liability), any mental state defined in Sections 4‑‑4, 4‑‑5 or 4‑‑6 is applicable.
(c) Knowledge that certain conduct constitutes an offense, or knowledge of the existence, meaning, or application of the statute defining an offense, is not an element of the offense unless the statute clearly defines it as such.
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)

(720 ILCS 5/4‑4) (from Ch. 38, par. 4‑4)
Sec. 4‑4. Intent.
A person intends, or acts intentionally or with intent, to accomplish a result or engage in conduct described by the statute defining the offense, when his conscious objective or purpose is to accomplish that result or engage in that conduct.
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)

(720 ILCS 5/4‑5) (from Ch. 38, par. 4‑5)
Sec. 4‑5. Knowledge.
A person knows, or acts knowingly or with knowledge of:
(a) The nature or attendant circumstances of his conduct, described by the statute defining the offense, when he is consciously aware that his conduct is of such nature or that such circumstances exist. Knowledge of a material fact includes awareness of the substantial probability that such fact exists.
(b) The result of his conduct, described by the statute defining the offense, when he is consciously aware that such result is practically certain to be caused by his conduct.
Conduct performed knowingly or with knowledge is performed wilfully, within the meaning of a statute using the latter term, unless the statute clearly requires another meaning.
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)

(720 ILCS 5/4‑6) (from Ch. 38, par. 4‑6)
Sec. 4‑6. Recklessness.
A person is reckless or acts recklessly, when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or that a result will follow, described by the statute defining the offense; and such disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would exercise in the situation. An act performed recklessly is performed wantonly, within the meaning of a statute using the latter term, unless the statute clearly requires another meaning.
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)

(720 ILCS 5/4‑7) (from Ch. 38, par. 4‑7)
Sec. 4‑7. Negligence.
A person is negligent, or acts negligently, when he fails to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or a result will follow, described by the statute defining the offense; and such failure constitutes a substantial deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would exercise in the situation.
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)

(720 ILCS 5/4‑8) (from Ch. 38, par. 4‑8)
Sec. 4‑8. Ignorance or mistake. (a) A person's ignorance or mistake as to a matter of either fact or law, except as provided in Section 4‑3(c) above, is a defense if it negatives the existence of the mental state which the statute prescribes with respect to an element of the offense.
(b) A person's reasonable belief that his conduct does not constitute an offense is a defense if:
(1) The offense is defined by an administrative regulation or order which is not known to him and has not been published or otherwise made reasonably available to him, and he could not have acquired such knowledge by the exercise of due diligence pursuant to facts known to him; or
(2) He acts in reliance upon a statute which later is determined to be invalid; or
(3) He acts in reliance upon an order or opinion of an Illinois Appellate or Supreme Court, or a United States appellate court later overruled or reversed;
(4) He acts in reliance upon an official interpretation of the statute, regulation or order defining the offense, made by a public officer or agency legally authorized to interpret such statute.
(c) Although a person's ignorance or mistake of fact or law, or reasonable belief, described in this Section 4‑‑8 is a defense to the offense charged, he may be convicted of an included offense of which he would be guilty if the fact or law were as he believed it to be.
(d) A defense based upon this Section 4‑‑8 is an affirmative defense.
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)

(720 ILCS 5/4‑9) (from Ch. 38, par. 4‑9)
Sec. 4‑9. Absolute liability.
A person may be guilty of an offense without having, as to each element thereof, one of the mental states described in Sections 4‑‑4 through 4‑‑7 if the offense is a misdemeanor which is not punishable by incarceration or by a fine exceeding $500, or the statute defining the offense clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose absolute liability for the conduct described.
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)


(720 ILCS 5/Art. 5 heading)
ARTICLE 5. PARTIES TO CRIME

(720 ILCS 5/5‑1) (from Ch. 38, par. 5‑1)
Sec. 5‑1. Accountability for conduct of another.
A person is responsible for conduct which is an element of an offense if the conduct is either that of the person himself, or that of another and he is legally accountable for such conduct as provided in Section 5‑‑2, or both.
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)

(720 ILCS 5/5‑2) (from Ch. 38, par. 5‑2)
Sec. 5‑2. When accountability exists.
A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another when:
(a) Having a mental state described by the statute defining the offense, he causes another to perform the conduct, and the other person in fact or by reason of legal incapacity lacks such a mental state; or
(b) The statute defining the offense makes him so accountable; or
(c) Either before or during the commission of an offense, and with the intent to promote or facilitate such commission, he solicits, aids, abets, agrees or attempts to aid, such other person in the planning or commission of the offense. However, a person is not so accountable, unless the statute defining the offense provides otherwise, if:
(1) He is a victim of the offense committed; or
(2) The offense is so defined that his conduct was inevitably incident to its commission; or
(3) Before the commission of the offense, he terminates his effort to promote or facilitate such commission, and does one of the following: wholly deprives his prior efforts of effectiveness in such commission, or gives timely warning to the proper law enforcement authorities, or otherwise makes proper effort to prevent the commission of the offense.
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)

(720 ILCS 5/5‑3) (from Ch. 38, par. 5‑3)
Sec. 5‑3. Separate conviction of person accountable.
A person who is legally accountable for the conduct of another which is an element of an offense may be convicted upon proof that the offense was committed and that he was so accountable, although the other person claimed to have committed the offense has not been prosecuted or convicted, or has been convicted of a different offense or degree of offense, or is not amenable to justice, or has been acquitted.
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)

(720 ILCS 5/5‑4) (from Ch. 38, par. 5‑4)
Sec. 5‑4. Responsibility of corporation. (a) A corporation may be prosecuted for the commission of an offense if, but only if:
(1) The offense is a misdemeanor, or is defined by Sections 11‑20, 11‑20.1 or 24‑1 of this Code, or Section 44 of the "Environmental Protection Act", approved June 29, 1970, as amended or is defined by another statute which clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose liability on a corporation; and an agent of the corporation performs the conduct which is an element of the offense while acting within the scope of his or her office or employment and in behalf of the corporation, except that any limitation in the defining statute, concerning the corporation's accountability for certain agents or under certain circumstances, is applicable; or
(2) The commission of the offense is authorized, requested, commanded, or performed, by the board of directors or by a high managerial agent who is acting within the scope of his or her employment in behalf of the corporation.
(b) A corporation's proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the high managerial agent having supervisory responsibility over the conduct which is the subject matter of the offense exercised due diligence to prevent the commission of the offense, is a defense to a prosecution for any offense to which Subsection (a) (1) refers, other than an offense for which absolute liability is imposed. This Subsection is inapplicable if the legislative purpose of the statute defining the offense is inconsistent with the provisions of this Subsection.
(c) For the purpose of this Section:
(1) "Agent" means any director, officer, servant, employee, or other person who is authorized to act in behalf of the corporation.
(2) "High managerial agent" means an officer of the corporation, or any other agent who has a position of comparable authority for the formulation of corporate policy or the supervision of subordinate employees in a managerial capacity.
(Source: P.A. 85‑1440.)

(720 ILCS 5/5‑5) (from Ch. 38, par. 5‑5)
Sec. 5‑5. Accountability for conduct of corporation.
(a) A person is legally accountable for conduct which is an element of an offense and which, in the name or in behalf of a corporation, he performs or causes to be performed, to the same extent as if the conduct were performed in his own name or behalf.
(b) An individual who has been convicted of an offense by reason of his legal accountability for the conduct of a corporation is subject to the punishment authorized by law for an individual upon conviction of such offense, although only a lesser or different punishment is authorized for the corporation.
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)


(720 ILCS 5/Art. 6 heading)
ARTICLE 6. RESPONSIBILITY

(720 ILCS 5/6‑1) (from Ch. 38, par. 6‑1)
Sec. 6‑1. Infancy.
No person shall be convicted of any offense unless he had attained his 13th birthday at the time the offense was committed.
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)

(720 ILCS 5/6‑2) (from Ch. 38, par. 6‑2)
Sec. 6‑2. Insanity.
(a) A person is not criminally responsible for conduct if at the time of such conduct, as a result of mental disease or mental defect, he lacks substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct.
(b) The terms "mental disease or mental defect" do not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct.
(c) A person who, at the time of the commission of a criminal offense, was not insane but was suffering from a mental illness, is not relieved of criminal responsibility for his conduct and may be found guilty but mentally ill.
(d) For purposes of this Section, "mental illness" or "mentally ill" means a substantial disorder of thought, mood, or behavior which afflicted a person at the time of the commission of the offense and which impaired that person's judgment, but not to the extent that he is unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his behavior.
(e) When the defense of insanity has been presented during the trial, the burden of proof is on the defendant to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is not guilty by reason of insanity. However, the burden of proof remains on the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each of the elements of each of the offenses charged, and, in a jury trial where the insanity defense has been presented, the jury must be instructed that it may not consider whether the defendant has met his burden of proving that he is not guilty by reason of insanity until and unless it has first determined that the State has proven the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense with which he is charged.
(Source: P.A. 89‑404, eff. 8‑20‑95; 90‑593, eff. 6‑19‑98.)

(720 ILCS 5/6‑3) (from Ch. 38, par. 6‑3)
Sec. 6‑3. Intoxicated or drugged condition. A person who is in an intoxicated or drugged condition is criminally responsible for conduct unless such condition is involuntarily produced and deprives him of substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.
(Source: P.A. 92‑466, eff. 1‑1‑02.)

(720 ILCS 5/6‑4) (from Ch. 38, par. 6‑4)
Sec. 6‑4. Affirmative Defense. A defense based upon any of the provisions of Article 6 is an affirmative defense except that mental illness is not an affirmative defense, but an alternative plea or finding that may be accepted, under appropriate evidence, when the affirmative defense of insanity is raised or the plea of guilty but mentally ill is made.
(Source: P.A. 82‑553.)


(720 ILCS 5/Art. 7 heading)
ARTICLE 7. JUSTIFIABLE USE OF FORCE; EXONERATION

(720 ILCS 5/7‑1) (from Ch. 38, par. 7‑1)
Sec. 7‑1. Use of force in defense of person.
(a) A person is justified in the use of force against another when and to the extent that he reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to defend himself or another against such other's imminent use of unlawful force. However, he is justified in the use of force which is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm only if he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or another, or the commission of a forcible felony.
(b) In no case shall any act involving the use of force justified under this Section give rise to any claim or liability brought by or on behalf of any person acting within the definition of "aggressor" set forth in Section 7‑4 of this Article, or the estate, spouse, or other family member of such a person, against the person or estate of the person using such justified force, unless the use of force involves willful or wanton misconduct.
(Source: P.A. 93‑832, eff. 7‑28‑04.)

(720 ILCS 5/7‑2) (from Ch. 38, par. 7‑2)
Sec. 7‑2. Use of force in defense of dwelling.
(a) A person is justified in the use of force against another when and to the extent that he reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to prevent or terminate such other's unlawful entry into or attack upon a dwelling. However, he is justified in the use of force which is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm only if:
(1) The entry is made or attempted in a violent,

riotous, or tumultuous manner, and he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent an assault upon, or offer of personal violence to, him or another then in the dwelling, or
(2) He reasonably believes that such force is

necessary to prevent the commission of a felony in the dwelling.
(b) In no case shall any act involving the use of force justified under this Section give rise to any claim or liability brought by or on behalf of any person acting within the definition of "aggressor" set forth in Section 7‑4 of this Article, or the estate, spouse, or other family member of such a person, against the person or estate of the person using such justified force, unless the use of force involves willful or wanton misconduct.
(Source: P.A. 93‑832, eff. 7‑28‑04.)

(720 ILCS 5/7‑3) (from Ch. 38, par. 7‑3)
Sec. 7‑3. Use of force in defense of other property.
(a) A person is justified in the use of force against another when and to the extent that he reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to prevent or terminate such other's trespass on or other tortious or criminal interference with either real property (other than a dwelling) or personal property, lawfully in his possession or in the possession of another who is a member of his immediate family or household or of a person whose property he has a legal duty to protect. However, he is justified in the use of force which is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm only if he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent the commission of a forcible felony.
(b) In no case shall any act involving the use of force justified under this Section give rise to any claim or liability brought by or on behalf of any person acting within the definition of "aggressor" set forth in Section 7‑4 of this Article, or the estate, spouse, or other family member of such a person, against the person or estate of the person using such justified force, unless the use of force involves willful or wanton misconduct.
(Source: P.A. 93‑832, eff. 7‑28‑04.)

(720 ILCS 5/7‑4) (from Ch. 38, par. 7‑4)
Sec. 7‑4. Use of force by aggressor.
The justification described in the preceding Sections of this Article is not available to a person who:
(a) Is attempting to commit, committing, or escaping after the commission of, a forcible felony; or
(b) Initially provokes the use of force against himself, with the intent to use such force as an excuse to inflict bodily harm upon the assailant; or
(c) Otherwise initially provokes the use of force against himself, unless:
(1) Such force is so great that he reasonably believes that he is in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm, and that he has exhausted every reasonable means to escape such danger other than the use of force which is likely to cause death or great bodily harm to the assailant; or
(2) In good faith, he withdraws from physical contact with the assailant and indicates clearly to the assailant that he desires to withdraw and terminate the use of force, but the assailant continues or resumes the use of force.
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)

(720 ILCS 5/7‑5) (from Ch. 38, par. 7‑5)
Sec. 7‑5. Peace officer's use of force in making arrest. (a) A peace officer, or any person whom he has summoned or directed to assist him, need not retreat or desist from efforts to make a lawful arrest because of resistance or threatened resistance to the arrest. He is justified in the use of any force which he reasonably believes to be necessary to effect the arrest and of any force which he reasonably believes to be necessary to defend himself or another from bodily harm while making the arrest. However, he is justified in using force likely to cause death or great bodily harm only when he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent death or great bodily harm to himself or such other person, or when he reasonably believes both that:
(1) Such force is necessary to prevent the arrest from being defeated by resistance or escape; and
(2) The person to be arrested has committed or attempted a forcible felony which involves the infliction or threatened infliction of great bodily harm or is attempting to escape by use of a deadly weapon, or otherwise indicates that he will endanger human life or inflict great bodily harm unless arrested without delay.
(b) A peace officer making an arrest pursuant to an invalid warrant is justified in the use of any force which he would be justified in using if the warrant were valid, unless he knows that the warrant is invalid.
(Source: P.A. 84‑1426.)

(720 ILCS 5/7‑6) (from Ch. 38, par. 7‑6)
Sec. 7‑6. Private person's use of force in making arrest.
(a) A private person who makes, or assists another private person in making a lawful arrest is justified in the use of any force which he would be justified in using if he were summoned or directed by a peace officer to make such arrest, except that he is justified in the use of force likely to cause death or great bodily harm only when he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent death or great bodily harm to himself or another.
(b) A private person who is summoned or directed by a peace officer to assist in making an arrest which is unlawful, is justified in the use of any force which he would be justified in using if the arrest were lawful, unless he knows that the arrest is unlawful.
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)

(720 ILCS 5/7‑7) (from Ch. 38, par. 7‑7)
Sec. 7‑7. Private person's use of force in resisting arrest. A person is not authorized to use force to resist an arrest which he knows is being made either by a peace officer or by a private person summoned and directed by a peace officer to make the arrest, even if he believes that the arrest is unlawful and the arrest in fact is unlawful.
(Source: P.A. 86‑1475.)

(720 ILCS 5/7‑8) (from Ch. 38, par. 7‑8)
Sec. 7‑8. Force likely to cause death or great bodily harm.
(a) Force which is likely to cause death or great bodily harm, within the meaning of Sections 7‑5 and 7‑6 includes:
(1) The firing of a firearm in the direction of the

person to be arrested, even though no intent exists to kill or inflict great bodily harm; and
(2) The firing of a firearm at a vehicle in which

the person to be arrested is riding.
(b) A peace officer's discharge of a firearm using ammunition designed to disable or control an individual without creating the likelihood of death or great bodily harm shall not be considered force likely to cause death or great bodily harm within the meaning of Sections 7‑5 and 7‑6.
(Source: P.A. 90‑138, eff. 1‑1‑98.)

(720 ILCS 5/7‑9) (from Ch. 38, par. 7‑9)
Sec. 7‑9. Use of force to prevent escape.
(a) A peace officer or other person who has an arrested person in his custody is justified in the use of such force to prevent the escape of the arrested person from custody as he would be justified in using if he were arresting such person.
(b) A guard or other peace officer is justified in the use of force, including force likely to cause death or great bodily harm, which he reasonably believes to be necessary to prevent the escape from a penal institution of a person whom the officer reasonably believes to be lawfully detained in such institution under sentence for an offense or awaiting trial or commitment for an offense.
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)

(720 ILCS 5/7‑10) (from Ch. 38, par. 7‑10)
Sec. 7‑10. Execution of death sentence.
A public officer who, in the exercise of his official duty, puts a person to death pursuant to a sentence of a court of competent jurisdiction, is justified if he acts in accordance with the sentence pronounced and the law prescribing the procedure for execution of a death sentence.
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)

(720 ILCS 5/7‑11) (from Ch. 38, par. 7‑11)
Sec. 7‑11. Compulsion.
(a) A person is not guilty of an offense, other than an offense punishable with death, by reason of conduct which he performs under the compulsion of threat or menace of the imminent infliction of death or great bodily harm, if he reasonably believes death or great bodily harm will be inflicted upon him if he does not perform such conduct.
(b) A married woman is not entitled, by reason of the presence of her husband, to any presumption of compulsion, or to any defense of compulsion except that stated in Subsection (a).
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)

(720 ILCS 5/7‑12) (from Ch. 38, par. 7‑12)
Sec. 7‑12. Entrapment.
A person is not guilty of an offense if his or her conduct is incited or induced by a public officer or employee, or agent of either, for the purpose of obtaining evidence for the prosecution of that person. However, this Section is inapplicable if the person was pre‑disposed to commit the offense and the public officer or employee, or agent of either, merely affords to that person the opportunity or facility for committing an offense.
(Source: P.A. 89‑332, eff. 1‑1‑96.)

(720 ILCS 5/7‑13) (from Ch. 38, par. 7‑13)
Sec. 7‑13. Necessity.
Conduct which would otherwise be an offense is justifiable by reason of necessity if the accused was without blame in occasioning or developing the situation and reasonably believed such conduct was necessary to avoid a public or private injury greater than the injury which might reasonably result from his own conduct.
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)

(720 ILCS 5/7‑14) (from Ch. 38, par. 7‑14)
Sec. 7‑14. Affirmative defense. A defense of justifiable use of force, or of exoneration, based on the provisions of this Article is an affirmative defense.
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)


(720 ILCS 5/Tit. III heading)
TITLE III. SPECIFIC OFFENSES


(720 ILCS 5/Tit. III Pt. A heading)
PART A. INCHOATE OFFENSES


(720 ILCS 5/Art. 8 heading)
ARTICLE 8. SOLICITATION, CONSPIRACY AND ATTEMPT

(720 ILCS 5/8‑1) (from Ch. 38, par. 8‑1)
Sec. 8‑1. Solicitation. (a) Elements of the offense. A person commits solicitation when, with intent that an offense be committed, other than first degree murder, he commands, encourages or requests another to commit that offense.
(b) Penalty.
A person convicted of solicitation may be fined or imprisoned or both not to exceed the maximum provided for the offense solicited: Provided, however, the penalty shall not exceed the corresponding maximum limit provided by subparagraph (c) of Section 8‑4 of this Act, as heretofore and hereafter amended.
(Source: P.A. 85‑1030.)

(720 ILCS 5/8‑1.1) (from Ch. 38, par. 8‑1.1)
Sec. 8‑1.1. Solicitation of Murder.
(a) A person commits solicitation of murder when, with the intent that the offense of first degree murder be committed, he commands, encourages or requests another to commit that offense.
(b) Penalty. Solicitation of murder is a Class X felony and a person convicted of solicitation of murder shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment for a period of not less than 15 years and not more than 30 years, except that in cases where the person solicited was a person under the age of 17 years, the person convicted of solicitation of murder shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment for a period of not less than 20 years and not more than 60 years.
(Source: P.A. 89‑688, eff. 6‑1‑97; 89‑689, eff. 12‑31‑96.)

(720 ILCS 5/8‑1.2) (from Ch. 38, par. 8‑1.2)
Sec. 8‑1.2. Solicitation of Murder for Hire. (a) A person commits solicitation of murder for hire when, with the intent that the offense of first degree murder be committed, he procures another to commit that offense pursuant to any contract, agreement, understanding, command or request for money or anything of value.
(b) Penalty. Solicitation of murder for hire is a Class X felony and a person convicted of solicitation of murder for hire shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 20 years and not more than 40 years.
(Source: P.A. 85‑1003; 85‑1030; 85‑1440.)

(720 ILCS 5/8‑2) (from Ch. 38, par. 8‑2)
Sec. 8‑2. Conspiracy.
(a) Elements of the offense. A person commits conspiracy when, with intent that an offense be committed, he agrees with another to the commission of that offense. No person may be convicted of conspiracy to commit an offense unless an act in furtherance of such agreement is alleged and proved to have been committed by him or by a co‑conspirator.
(b) Co‑conspirators.
It shall not be a defense to conspiracy that the person or persons with whom the accused is alleged to have conspired:
(1) Has not been prosecuted or convicted, or
(2) Has been convicted of a different offense, or
(3) Is not amenable to justice, or
(4) Has been acquitted, or
(5) Lacked the capacity to commit an offense.
(c) Sentence.
A person convicted of conspiracy may be fined or imprisoned or both not to exceed the maximum provided for the offense which is the object of the conspiracy, except that if the object is an offense prohibited by Sections 11‑15, 11‑16, 11‑17, 11‑19, 24‑1(a)(1), 24‑1(a)(7), 28‑1, 28‑3 and 28‑4 of the "Criminal Code of 1961", approved July 28, 1961, as amended, or prohibited by Sections 404 or 406 (b) of the "Illinois Controlled Substances Act", enacted by the 77th General Assembly, or an inchoate offense related to any of the aforesaid principal offenses, the person convicted may be sentenced for a Class 3 felony however, conspiracy to commit treason, first degree murder, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated criminal sexual assault, or predatory criminal sexual assault of a child is a Class 1 felony, and conspiracy to commit any offense other than those specified in this subsection, and other than those set forth in Sections 401, 402, or 407 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act, shall not be sentenced in excess of a Class 4 felony.
(Source: P.A. 94‑184, eff. 7‑12‑05.)

(720 ILCS 5/8‑2.1)
Sec. 8‑2.1. Conspiracy against civil rights.
(a) Offense. A person commits conspiracy against civil rights when, without legal justification, he or she, with the intent to interfere with the free exercise of any right or privilege secured by the Constitution of the United States, the Constitution of the State of Illinois, the laws of the United States, or the laws of the State of Illinois by any person or persons, agrees with another to inflict physical harm on any other person or the threat of physical harm on any other person and either the accused or a co‑conspirator has committed any act in furtherance of that agreement.
(b) Co‑conspirators. It shall not be a defense to conspiracy against civil rights that a person or persons with whom the accused is alleged to have conspired:
(1) has not been prosecuted or convicted; or
(2) has been convicted of a different offense; or
(3) is not amenable to justice; or
(4) has been acquitted; or
(5) lacked the capacity to commit an offense.
(c) Sentence. Conspiracy against civil rights is a Class 4 felony for a first offense and a Class 2 felony for a second or subsequent offense.
(Source: P.A. 92‑830, eff. 1‑1‑03.)

(720 ILCS 5/8‑3) (from Ch. 38, par. 8‑3)
Sec. 8‑3. Defense.
It is a defense to a charge of solicitation or conspiracy that if the criminal object were achieved the accused would not be guilty of an offense.
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)

(720 ILCS 5/8‑4) (from Ch. 38, par. 8‑4)
Sec. 8‑4. Attempt.
(a) Elements of the Offense.
A person commits an attempt when, with intent to commit a specific offense, he does any act which constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of that offense.
(b) Impossibility.
It shall not be a defense to a charge of attempt that because of a misapprehension of the circumstances it would have been impossible for the accused to commit the offense attempted.
(c) Sentence.
A person convicted of an attempt may be fined or imprisoned or both not to exceed the maximum provided for the offense attempted but, except for an attempt to commit the offense defined in Section 33A‑2 of this Act,
(1) the sentence for attempt to commit first degree

murder is the sentence for a Class X felony, except that
(A) an attempt to commit first degree murder

when at least one of the aggravating factors specified in paragraphs (1), (2) and (12) of subsection (b) of Section 9‑1 is present is a Class X felony for which the sentence shall be a term of imprisonment of not less than 20 years and not more than 80 years;
(B) an attempt to commit first degree murder

while armed with a firearm is a Class X felony for which 15 years shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court;
(C) an attempt to commit first degree murder

during which the person personally discharged a firearm is a Class X felony for which 20 years shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court;
(D) an attempt to commit first degree murder

during which the person personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused great bodily harm, permanent disability, permanent disfigurement, or death to another person, is a Class X felony for which 25 years or up to a term of natural life shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court.
(2) the sentence for attempt to commit a Class X

felony is the sentence for a Class 1 felony;
(3) the sentence for attempt to commit a Class 1

felony is the sentence for a Class 2 felony;
(4) the sentence for attempt to commit a Class 2

felony is the sentence for a Class 3 felony; and
(5) the sentence for attempt to commit any felony

other than those specified in subsections (1), (2), (3) and (4) hereof is the sentence for a Class A misdemeanor.
(Source: P.A. 91‑404, eff. 1‑1‑00; 91‑696, eff. 4‑13‑00.)

(720 ILCS 5/8‑5) (from Ch. 38, par. 8‑5)
Sec. 8‑5. Multiple convictions.
No person shall be convicted of both the inchoate and the principal offense.
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)

(720 ILCS 5/8‑6) (from Ch. 38, par. 8‑6)
Sec. 8‑6. Offense. For the purposes of this Article, "offense" shall include conduct which if performed in another State would be criminal by the laws of that State and which conduct if performed in this State would be an offense under the laws of this State.
(Source: Laws 1961, p. 1983.)


(720 ILCS 5/Tit. III Pt. B heading)
PART B. OFFENSES DIRECTED AGAINST THE PERSON


(720 ILCS 5/Art. 9 heading)
ARTICLE 9. HOMICIDE

(720 ILCS 5/9‑1) (from Ch. 38, par. 9‑1)
Sec. 9‑1. First degree Murder ‑ Death penalties ‑ Exceptions ‑ Separate Hearings ‑ Proof ‑ Findings ‑ Appellate procedures ‑ Reversals.
(a) A person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits first degree murder if, in performing the acts which cause the death:
(1) he either intends to kill or do great bodily harm

to that individual or another, or knows that such acts will cause death to that individual or another; or
(2) he knows that such acts create a strong

probability of death or great bodily harm to that individual or another; or
(3) he is attempting or committing a forcible felony

other than second degree murder.
(b) Aggravating Factors. A defendant who at the time of the commission of the offense has attained the age of 18 or more and who has been found guilty of first degree murder may be sentenced to death if:
(1) the murdered individual was a peace officer or

fireman killed in the course of performing his official duties, to prevent the performance of his official duties, or in retaliation for performing his official duties, and the defendant knew or should have known that the murdered individual was a peace officer or fireman; or
(2) the murdered individual was an employee of an

institution or facility of the Department of Corrections, or any similar local correctional agency, killed in the course of performing his official duties, to prevent the performance of his official duties, or in retaliation for performing his official duties, or the murdered individual was an inmate at such institution or facility and was killed on the grounds thereof, or the murdered individual was otherwise present in such institution or facility with the knowledge and approval of the chief administrative officer thereof; or
(3) the defendant has been convicted of murdering two

or more individuals under subsection (a) of this Section or under any law of the United States or of any state which is substantially similar to subsection (a) of this Section regardless of whether the deaths occurred as the result of the same act or of several related or unrelated acts so long as the deaths were the result of either an intent to kill more than one person or of separate acts which the defendant knew would cause death or create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to the murdered individual or another; or
(4) the murdered individual was killed as a result of

the hijacking of an airplane, train, ship, bus or other public conveyance; or
(5) the defendant committed the murder pursuant to a

contract, agreement or understanding by which he was to receive money or anything of value in return for committing the murder or procured another to commit the murder for money or anything of value; or
(6) the murdered individual was killed in the course

of another felony if:
(a) the murdered individual:
(i) was actually killed by the defendant, or
(ii) received physical injuries personally

inflicted by the defendant substantially contemporaneously with physical injuries caused by one or more persons for whose conduct the defendant is legally accountable under Section 5‑2 of this Code, and the physical injuries inflicted by either the defendant or the other person or persons for whose conduct he is legally accountable caused the death of the murdered individual; and
(b) in performing the acts which caused the death

of the murdered individual or which resulted in physical injuries personally inflicted by the defendant on the murdered individual under the circumstances of subdivision (ii) of subparagraph (a) of paragraph (6) of subsection (b) of this Section, the defendant acted with the intent to kill the murdered individual or with the knowledge that his acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to the murdered individual or another; and
(c) the other felony was an inherently violent

crime or the attempt to commit an inherently violent crime. In this subparagraph (c), "inherently violent crime" includes, but is not limited to, armed robbery, robbery, predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, aggravated criminal sexual assault, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated vehicular hijacking, aggravated arson, aggravated stalking, residential burglary, and home invasion; or
(7) the murdered individual was under 12 years of age

and the death resulted from exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty; or
(8) the defendant committed the murder with intent to

prevent the murdered individual from testifying or participating in any criminal investigation or prosecution or giving material assistance to the State in any investigation or prosecution, either against the defendant or another; or the defendant committed the murder because the murdered individual was a witness in any prosecution or gave material assistance to the State in any investigation or prosecution, either against the defendant or another; for purposes of this paragraph (8), "participating in any criminal investigation or prosecution" is intended to include those appearing in the proceedings in any capacity such as trial judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, investigators, witnesses, or jurors; or
(9) the defendant, while committing an offense

punishable under Sections 401, 401.1, 401.2, 405, 405.2, 407 or 407.1 or subsection (b) of Section 404 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act, or while engaged in a conspiracy or solicitation to commit such offense, intentionally killed an individual or counseled, commanded, induced, procured or caused the intentional killing of the murdered individual; or
(10) the defendant was incarcerated in an institution

or facility of the Department of Corrections at the time of the murder, and while committing an offense punishable as a felony under Illinois law, or while engaged in a conspiracy or solicitation to commit such offense, intentionally killed an individual or counseled, commanded, induced, procured or caused the intentional killing of the murdered individual; or
(11) the murder was committed in a cold, calculated

and premeditated manner pursuant to a preconceived plan, scheme or design to take a human life by unlawful means, and the conduct of the defendant created a reasonable expectation that the death of a human being would result therefrom; or
(12) the murdered individual was an emergency medical

technician ‑ ambulance, emergency medical technician ‑ intermediate, emergency medical technician ‑ paramedic, ambulance driver, or other medical assistance or first aid personnel, employed by a municipality or other governmental unit, killed in the course of performing his official duties, to prevent the performance of his official duties, or in retaliation for performing his official duties, and the defendant knew or should have known that the murdered individual was an emergency medical technician ‑ ambulance, emergency medical technician ‑ intermediate, emergency medical technician ‑ paramedic, ambulance driver, or other medical assistance or first aid personnel; or
(13) the defendant was a principal administrator,

organizer, or leader of a calculated criminal drug conspiracy consisting of a hierarchical position of authority superior to that of all other members of the conspiracy, and the defendant counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or caused the intentional killing of the murdered person; or
(14) the murder was intentional and involved the

infliction of torture. For the purpose of this Section torture means the infliction of or subjection to extreme physical pain, motivated by an intent to increase or prolong the pain, suffering or agony of the victim; or
(15) the murder was committed as a result of the

intentional discharge of a firearm by the defendant from a motor vehicle and the victim was not present within the motor vehicle; or
(16) the murdered individual was 60 years of age or

older and the death resulted from exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty; or
(17) the murdered individual was a disabled person

and the defendant knew or should have known that the murdered individual was disabled. For purposes of this paragraph (17), "disabled person" means a person who suffers from a permanent physical or mental impairment resulting from disease, an injury, a functional disorder, or a congenital condition that renders the person incapable of adequately providing for his or her own health or personal care; or
(18) the murder was committed by reason of any

person's activity as a community policing volunteer or to prevent any person from engaging in activity as a community policing volunteer; or
(19) the murdered individual was subject to an order

of protection and the murder was committed by a person against whom the same order of protection was issued under the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986; or
(20) the murdered individual was known by the

defendant to be a teacher or other person employed in any school and the teacher or other employee is upon the grounds of a school or grounds adjacent to a school, or is in any part of a building used for school purposes; or
(21) the murder was committed by the defendant in

connection with or as a result of the offense of terrorism as defined in Section 29D‑30 of this Code.
(c) Consideration of factors in Aggravation and Mitigation.
The court shall consider, or shall instruct the jury to consider any aggravating and any mitigating factors which are relevant to the imposition of the death penalty. Aggravating factors may include but need not be limited to those factors set forth in subsection (b). Mitigating factors may include but need not be limited to the following:
(1) the defendant has no significant history of prior

criminal activity;
(2) the murder was committed while the defendant was

under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, although not such as to constitute a defense to prosecution;
(3) the murdered individual was a participant in the

defendant's homicidal conduct or consented to the homicidal act;
(4) the defendant acted under the compulsion of

threat or menace of the imminent infliction of death or great bodily harm;
(5) the defendant was not personally present during

commission of the act or acts causing death;
(6) the defendant's background includes a history of

extreme emotional or physical abuse;
(7) the defendant suffers from a reduced mental

capacity.
(d) Separate sentencing hearing.
Where requested by the State, the court shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to determine the existence of factors set forth in subsection (b) and to consider any aggravating or mitigating factors as indicated in subsection (c). The proceeding shall be conducted:
(1) before the jury that determined the defendant's

guilt; or
(2) before a jury impanelled for the purpose of the

proceeding if:
A. the defendant was convicted upon a plea of

guilty; or
B. the defendant was convicted after a trial

before the court sitting without a jury; or
C. the court for good cause shown discharges the

jury that determined the defendant's guilt; or
(3) before the court alone if the defendant waives a

jury for the separate proceeding.
(e) Evidence and Argument.
During the proceeding any information relevant to any of the factors set forth in subsection (b) may be presented by either the State or the defendant under the rules governing the admission of evidence at criminal trials. Any information relevant to any additional aggravating factors or any mitigating factors indicated in subsection (c) may be presented by the State or defendant regardless of its admissibility under the rules governing the admission of evidence at criminal trials. The State and the defendant shall be given fair opportunity to rebut any information received at the hearing.
(f) Proof.
The burden of proof of establishing the existence of any of the factors set forth in subsection (b) is on the State and shall not be satisfied unless established beyond a reasonable doubt.
(g) Procedure ‑ Jury.
If at the separate sentencing proceeding the jury finds that none of the factors set forth in subsection (b) exists, the court shall sentence the defendant to a term of imprisonment under Chapter V of the Unified Code of Corrections. If there is a unanimous finding by the jury that one or more of the factors set forth in subsection (b) exist, the jury shall consider aggravating and mitigating factors as instructed by the court and shall determine whether the sentence of death shall be imposed. If the jury determines unanimously, after weighing the factors in aggravation and mitigation, that death is the appropriate sentence, the court shall sentence the defendant to death. If the court does not concur with the jury determination that death is the appropriate sentence, the court shall set forth reasons in writing including what facts or circumstances the court relied upon, along with any relevant documents, that compelled the court to non‑concur with the sentence. This document and any attachments shall be part of the record for appellate review. The court shall be bound by the jury's sentencing determination.
If after weighing the factors in aggravation and mitigation, one or more jurors determines that death is not the appropriate sentence, the court shall sentence the defendant to a term of imprisonment under Chapter V of the Unified Code of Corrections.
(h) Procedure ‑ No Jury.
In a proceeding before the court alone, if the court finds that none of the factors found in subsection (b) exists, the court shall sentence the defendant to a term of imprisonment under Chapter V of the Unified Code of Corrections.
If the Court determines that one or more of the factors set forth in subsection (b) exists, the Court shall consider any aggravating and mitigating factors as indicated in subsection (c). If the Court determines, after weighing the factors in aggravation and mitigation, that death is the appropriate sentence, the Court shall sentence the defendant to death.
If the court finds that death is not the appropriate sentence, the court shall sentence the defendant to a term of imprisonment under Chapter V of the Unified Code of Corrections.
(h‑5) Decertification as a capital case.
In a case in which the defendant has been found guilty of first degree murder by a judge or jury, or a case on remand for resentencing, and the State seeks the death penalty as an appropriate sentence, on the court's own motion or the written motion of the defendant, the court may decertify the case as a death penalty case if the court finds that the only evidence supporting the defendant's conviction is the uncorroborated testimony of an informant witness, as defined in Section 115‑21 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, concerning the confession or admission of the defendant or that the sole evidence against the defendant is a single eyewitness or single accomplice without any other corroborating evidence. If the court decertifies the case as a capital case under either of the grounds set forth above, the court shall issue a written finding. The State may pursue its right to appeal the decertification pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1). If the court does not decertify the case as a capital case, the matter shall proceed to the eligibility phase of the sentencing hearing.
(i) Appellate Procedure.
The conviction and sentence of death shall be subject to automatic review by the Supreme Court. Such review shall be in accordance with rules promulgated by the Supreme Court. The Illinois Supreme Court may overturn the death sentence, and order the imposition of imprisonment under Chapter V of the Unified Code of Corrections if the court finds that the death sentence is fundamentally unjust as applied to the particular case. If the Illinois Supreme Court finds that the death sentence is fundamentally unjust as applied to the particular case, independent of any procedural grounds for relief, the Illinois Supreme Court shall issue a written opinion explaining this finding.
(j) Disposition of reversed death sentence.
In the event that the death penalty in this Act is held to be unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States or of the State of Illinois, any person convicted of first degree murder shall be sentenced by the court to a term of imprisonment under Chapter V of the Unified Code of Corrections.
In the event that any death sentence pursuant to the sentencing provisions of this Section is declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States or of the State of Illinois, the court having jurisdiction over a person previously sentenced to death shall cause the defendant to be brought before the court, and the court shall sentence the defendant to a term of imprisonment under Chapter V of the Unified Code of Corrections.
(k) Guidelines for seeking the death penalty.
The Attorney General and State's Attorneys Association shall consult on voluntary guidelines for procedures governing whether or not to seek the death penalty. The guidelines do not have the force of law and are only advisory in nature.
(Source: P.A. 92‑854, eff. 12‑5‑02; 93‑605, eff. 11‑19‑03.)

(720 ILCS 5/9‑1.2) (from Ch. 38, par. 9‑1.2)
Sec. 9‑1.2. Intentional Homicide of an Unborn Child.
(a) A person commits the offense of intentional homicide of an unborn child if, in performing acts which cause the death of an unborn child, he without lawful justification:
(1) either intended to cause the death of or do

great bodily harm to the pregnant woman or her unborn child or knew that such acts would cause death or great bodily harm to the pregnant woman or her unborn child; or
(2) he knew that his acts created a strong

probability of death or great bodily harm to the pregnant woman or her unborn child; and
(3) he knew that the woman was pregnant.
(b) For purposes of this Section, (1) "unborn child" shall mean any individual of the human species from fertilization until birth, and (2) "person" shall not include the pregnant woman whose unborn child is killed.
(c) This Section shall not apply to acts which cause the death of an unborn child if those acts were committed during any abortion, as defined in Section 2 of the Illinois Abortion Law of 1975, as amended, to which the pregnant woman has consented. This Section shall not apply to acts which were committed pursuant to usual and customary standards of medical practice during diagnostic testing or therapeutic treatment.
(d) Penalty. The sentence for intentional homicide of an unborn child shall be the same as for first degree murder, except that:
(1) the death penalty may not be imposed;
(2) if the person committed the offense while armed

with a firearm, 15 years shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court;
(3) if, during the commission of the offense, the

person personally discharged a firearm, 20 years shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court;
(4) if, during the commission of the offense, the

person personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused great bodily harm, permanent disability, permanent disfigurement, or death to another person, 25 years or up to a term of natural life shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court.
(e) The provisions of this Act shall not be construed to prohibit the prosecution of any person under any other provision of law.
(Source: P.A. 91‑404, eff. 1‑1‑00.)

(720 ILCS 5/9‑2) (from Ch. 38, par. 9‑2)
Sec. 9‑2. Second Degree Murder. (a) A person commits the offense of second degree murder when he commits the offense of first degree murder as defined in paragraphs (1) or (2) of subsection (a) of Section 9‑1 of this Code and either of the following mitigating factors are present:
(1) At the time of the killing he is acting under a sudden and intense passion resulting from serious provocation by the individual killed or another whom the offender endeavors to kill, but he negligently or accidentally causes the death of the individual killed; or
(2) At the time of the killing he believes the circumstances to be such that, if they existed, would justify or exonerate the killing under the principles stated in Article 7 of this Code, but his belief is unreasonable.
(b) Serious provocation is conduct sufficient to excite an intense passion in a reasonable person.
(c) When a defendant is on trial for first degree murder and evidence of either of the mitigating factors defined in subsection (a) of this Section has been presented, the burden of proof is on the defendant to prove either mitigating factor by a preponderance of the evidence before the defendant can be found guilty of second degree murder. However, the burden of proof remains on the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each of the elements of first degree murder and, when appropriately raised, the absence of circumstances at the time of the killing that would justify or exonerate the killing under the principles stated in Article 7 of this Code. In a jury trial for first degree murder in which evidence of either of the mitigating factors defined in subsection (a) of this Section has been presented and the defendant has requested that the jury be given the option of finding the defendant guilty of second degree murder, the jury must be instructed that it may not consider whether the defendant has met his burden of proof with regard to second degree murder until and unless it has first determined that the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt each of the elements of first degree murder.
(d) Sentence.
Second Degree Murder is a Class 1 felony.
(Source: P.A. 84‑1450.)

(720 ILCS 5/9‑2.1) (from Ch. 38, par. 9‑2.1)
Sec. 9‑2.1. Voluntary Manslaughter of an Unborn Child. (a) A person who kills an unborn child without lawful justification commits voluntary manslaughter of an unborn child if at the time of the killing he is acting under a sudden and intense passion resulting from serious provocation by another whom the offender endeavors to kill, but he negligently or accidentally causes the death of the unborn child.
Serious provocation is conduct sufficient to excite an intense passion in a reasonable person.
(b) A person who intentionally or knowingly kills an unborn child commits voluntary manslaughter of an unborn child if at the time of the killing he believes the circumstances to be such that, if they existed, would justify or exonerate the killing under the principles stated in Article 7 of this Code, but his belief is unreasonable.
(c) Sentence. Voluntary Manslaughter of an unborn child is a Class 1 felony.
(d) For purposes of this Section, (1) "unborn child" shall mean any individual of the human species from fertilization until birth, and (2) "person" shall not include the pregnant woman whose unborn child is killed.
(e) This Section shall not apply to acts which cause the death of an unborn child if those acts were committed during any abortion, as defined in Section 2 of the Illinois Abortion Law of 1975, as amended, to which the pregnant woman has consented. This Section shall not apply to acts which were committed pursuant to usual and customary standards of medical practice during diagnostic testing or therapeutic treatment.
(Source: P.A. 84‑1414.)

(720 ILCS 5/9‑3) (from Ch. 38, par. 9‑3)
(Text of Section from P.A. 95‑467)
Sec. 9‑3. Involuntary Manslaughter and Reckless Homicide.
(a) A person who unintentionally kills an individual without lawful justification commits involuntary manslaughter if his acts whether lawful or unlawful which cause the death are such as are likely to cause death or great bodily harm to some individual, and he performs them recklessly, except in cases in which the cause of the death consists of the driving of a motor vehicle or operating a snowmobile, all‑terrain vehicle, or watercraft, in which case the person commits reckless homicide. A person commits reckless homicide if he or she unintentionally kills an individual while driving a vehicle and using an incline in a roadway, such as a railroad crossing, bridge approach, or hill, to cause the vehicle to become airborne.
(b) (Blank).
(c) (Blank).
(d) Sentence.
(1) Involuntary manslaughter is a Class 3 felony.
(2) Reckless homicide is a Class 3 felony.
(e) (Blank).
(e‑2) Except as provided in subsection (e‑3), in cases involving reckless homicide in which the offense is committed upon a public thoroughfare where children pass going to and from school when a school crossing guard is performing official duties, the penalty is a Class 2 felony, for which a person, if sentenced to a term of imprisonment, shall be sentenced to a term of not less than 3 years and not more than 14 years.
(e‑3) In cases involving reckless homicide in which (i) the offense is committed upon a public thoroughfare where children pass going to and from school when a school crossing guard is performing official duties and (ii) the defendant causes the deaths of 2 or more persons as part of a single course of conduct, the penalty is a Class 2 felony, for which a person, if sentenced to a term of imprisonment, shall be sentenced to a term of not less than 6 years and not more than 28 years.
(e‑5) (Blank).
(e‑7) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (e‑8), in cases involving reckless homicide in which the defendant was driving in a construction or maintenance zone, as defined in Section 11‑605 of the Illinois Vehicle Code, the penalty is a Class 2 felony, for which a person, if sentenced to a term of imprisonment, shall be sentenced to a term of not less than 3 years and not more than 14 years.
(e‑8) In cases involving reckless homicide in which the defendant was driving in a construction or maintenance zone, as defined in Section 11‑605 of the Illinois Vehicle Code, and caused the deaths of 2 or more persons as part of a single course of conduct, the penalty is a Class 2 felony, for which a person, if sentenced to a term of imprisonment, shall be sentenced to a term of not less than 6 years and not more than 28 years.
(e‑9) In cases involving reckless homicide in which the defendant drove a vehicle and used an incline in a roadway, such as a railroad crossing, bridge approach, or hill, to cause the vehicle to become airborne, and caused the deaths of 2 or more persons as part of a single course of conduct, the penalty is a Class 2 felony.
(f) In cases involving involuntary manslaughter in which the victim was a family or household member as defined in paragraph (3) of Section 112A‑3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, the penalty shall be a Class 2 felony, for which a person if sentenced to a term of imprisonment, shall be sentenced to a term of not less than 3 years and not more than 14 years.
(Source: P.A. 95‑467, eff. 6‑1‑08.)

(Text of Section from P.A. 95‑551)
Sec. 9‑3. Involuntary Manslaughter and Reckless Homicide.
(a) A person who unintentionally kills an individual without lawful justification commits involuntary manslaughter if his acts whether lawful or unlawful which cause the death are such as are likely to cause death or great bodily harm to some individual, and he performs them recklessly, except in cases in which the cause of the death consists of the driving of a motor vehicle or operating a snowmobile, all‑terrain vehicle, or watercraft, in which case the person commits reckless homicide. A person commits reckless homicide if he or she unintentionally kills an individual while driving a vehicle and using an incline in a roadway, such as a railroad crossing, bridge approach, or hill, to cause the vehicle to become airborne.
(b) (Blank).
(c) (Blank).
(d) Sentence.
(1) Involuntary manslaughter is a Class 3 felony.
(2) Reckless homicide is a Class 3 felony.
(e) (Blank).
(e‑5) (Blank).
(e‑7) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (e‑8), in cases involving reckless homicide in which the defendant was driving in a construction or maintenance zone, as defined in Section 11‑605 of the Illinois Vehicle Code, the penalty is a Class 2 felony, for which a person, if sentenced to a term of imprisonment, shall be sentenced to a term of not less than 3 years and not more than 14 years.
(e‑8) In cases involving reckless homicide in which the defendant was driving in a construction or maintenance zone, as defined in Section 11‑605 of the Illinois Vehicle Code, and caused the deaths of 2 or more persons as part of a single course of conduct, the penalty is a Class 2 felony, for which a person, if sentenced to a term of imprisonment, shall be sentenced to a term of not less than 6 years and not more than 28 years.
(e‑9) In cases involving reckless homicide in which the defendant drove a vehicle and used an incline in a roadway, such as a railroad crossing, bridge approach, or hill, to cause the vehicle to become airborne, and caused the deaths of 2 or more persons as part of a single course of conduct, the penalty is a Class 2 felony.
(e‑10) In cases involving involuntary manslaughter or reckless homicide resulting in the death of a peace officer killed in the performance of his or her duties as a peace officer, the penalty is a Class 2 felony.
(f) In cases involving involuntary manslaughter in which the victim was a family or household member as defined in paragraph (3) of Section 112A‑3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, the penalty shall be a Class 2 felony, for which a person if sentenced to a term of imprisonment, shall be sentenced to a term of not less than 3 years and not more than 14 years.
(Source: P.A. 95‑551, eff. 6‑1‑08.)

(Text of Section from P.A. 95‑587)
Sec. 9‑3. Involuntary Manslaughter and Reckless Homicide.
(a) A person who unintentionally kills an individual without lawful justification commits involuntary manslaughter if his acts whether lawful or unlawful which cause the death are such as are likely to cause death or great bodily harm to some individual, and he performs them recklessly, except in cases in which the cause of the death consists of the driving of a motor vehicle or operating a snowmobile, all‑terrain vehicle, or watercraft, in which case the person commits reckless homicide. A person commits reckless homicide if he or she unintentionally kills an individual while driving a vehicle and using an incline in a roadway, such as a railroad crossing, bridge approach, or hill, to cause the vehicle to become airborne.
(b) (Blank).
(c) (Blank).
(d) Sentence.
(1) Involuntary manslaughter is a Class 3 felony.
(2) Reckless homicide is a Class 3 felony.
(e) (Blank).
(e‑5) (Blank).
(e‑7) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (e‑8), in cases involving reckless homicide in which the defendant was driving in a construction or maintenance zone, as defined in Section 11‑605.1 of the Illinois Vehicle Code, the penalty is a Class 2 felony, for which a person, if sentenced to a term of imprisonment, shall be sentenced to a term of not less than 3 years and not more than 14 years.
(e‑8) In cases involving reckless homicide in which the defendant was driving in a construction or maintenance zone, as defined in Section 11‑605.1 of the Illinois Vehicle Code, and caused the deaths of 2 or more persons as part of a single course of conduct, the penalty is a Class 2 felony, for which a person, if sentenced to a term of imprisonment, shall be sentenced to a term of not less than 6 years and not more than 28 years.
(e‑9) In cases involving reckless homicide in which the defendant drove a vehicle and used an incline in a roadway, such as a railroad crossing, bridge approach, or hill, to cause the vehicle to become airborne, and caused the deaths of 2 or more persons as part of a single course of conduct, the penalty is a Class 2 felony.
(e‑10) In cases involving reckless homicide in which the defendant unintentionally kills an individual while driving in a posted school zone, as defined in Section 11‑605 of the Illinois Vehicle Code, while children are present or in a construction or maintenance zone, as defined in Section 11‑605.1 of the Illinois Vehicle Code, when construction or maintenance workers are present the trier of fact may infer that the defendant's actions were performed recklessly where he or she was also either driving at a speed of more than 20 miles per hour in excess of the posted speed limit or violating Section 11‑501 of the Illinois Vehicle Code.
(f) In cases involving involuntary manslaughter in which the victim was a family or household member as defined in paragraph (3) of Section 112A‑3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, the penalty shall be a Class 2 felony, for which a person if sentenced to a term of imprisonment, shall be sentenced to a term of not less than 3 years and not more than 14 years.
(Source: P.A. 95‑587, eff. 6‑1‑08.)

(Text of Section from P.A. 95‑591)
Sec. 9‑3. Involuntary Manslaughter and Reckless Homicide.
(a) A person who unintentionally kills an individual without lawful justification commits involuntary manslaughter if his acts whether lawful or unlawful which cause the death are such as are likely to cause death or great bodily harm to some individual, and he performs them recklessly, except in cases in which the cause of the death consists of the driving of a motor vehicle or operating a snowmobile, all‑terrain vehicle, or watercraft, in which case the person commits reckless homicide. A person commits reckless homicide if he or she unintentionally kills an individual while driving a vehicle and using an incline in a roadway, such as a railroad crossing, bridge approach, or hill, to cause the vehicle to become airborne.
(b) (Blank).
(c) (Blank).
(d) Sentence.
(1) Involuntary manslaughter is a Class 3 felony.
(2) Reckless homicide is a Class 3 felony.
(e) (Blank).
(e‑5) (Blank).
(e‑7) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (e‑8), in cases involving reckless homicide in which the defendant: (1) was driving in a construction or maintenance zone, as defined in Section 11‑605 of the Illinois Vehicle Code, or (2) was operating a vehicle while failing or refusing to comply with any lawful order or direction of any authorized police officer or traffic control aide engaged in traffic control, the penalty is a Class 2 felony, for which a person, if sentenced to a term of imprisonment, shall be sentenced to a term of not less than 3 years and not more than 14 years.
(e‑8) In cases involving reckless homicide in which the defendant caused the deaths of 2 or more persons as part of a single course of conduct and: (1) was driving in a construction or maintenance zone, as defined in Section 11‑605 of the Illinois Vehicle Code, or (2) was operating a vehicle while failing or refusing to comply with any lawful order or direction of any authorized police officer or traffic control aide engaged in traffic control, the penalty is a Class 2 felony, for which a person, if sentenced to a term of imprisonment, shall be sentenced to a term of not less than 6 years and not more than 28 years.
(e‑9) In cases involving reckless homicide in which the defendant drove a vehicle and used an incline in a roadway, such as a railroad crossing, bridge approach, or hill, to cause the vehicle to become airborne, and caused the deaths of 2 or more persons as part of a single course of conduct, the penalty is a Class 2 felony.
(f) In cases involving involuntary manslaughter in which the victim was a family or household member as defined in paragraph (3) of Section 112A‑3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, the penalty shall be a Class 2 felony, for which a person if sentenced to a term of imprisonment, shall be sentenced to a term of not less than 3 years and not more than 14 years.
(Source: P.A. 95‑591, eff. 9‑10‑07.)

(720 ILCS 5/9‑3.1) (from Ch. 38, par. 9‑3.1)
Sec. 9‑3.1. Concealment of homicidal death. (a) A person commits the offense of concealment of homicidal death when he conceals the death of any other person with knowledge that such other person has died by homicidal means.
(b) Nothing in this Section prevents the defendant from also being charged with and tried for the first degree murder, second degree murder or involuntary manslaughter of the person whose death is concealed. If a person convicted under this Section is also convicted of first degree murder, second degree murder or involuntary manslaughter, the penalty under this Section shall be imposed separately and in addition to the penalty for first degree murder, second degree murder or involuntary manslaughter.
(c) Sentence.
Concealment of homicidal death is a Class 3 felony.
(Source: P.A. 84‑1308; 84‑1450.)

(720 ILCS 5/9‑3.2) (from Ch. 38, par. 9‑3.2)
Sec. 9‑3.2. Involuntary Manslaughter and Reckless Homicide of an Unborn Child. (a) A person who unintentionally kills an unborn child without lawful justification commits involuntary manslaughter of an unborn child if his acts whether lawful or unlawful which cause the death are such as are likely to cause death or great bodily harm to some individual, and he performs them recklessly, except in cases in which the cause of death consists of the driving of a motor vehicle, in which case the person commits reckless homicide of an unborn child.
(b) Sentence.
(1) Involuntary manslaughter of an unborn child is a Class 3 felony.
(2) Reckless homicide of an unborn child is a Class 3 felony.
(c) For purposes of this Section, (1) "unborn child" shall mean any individual of the human species from fertilization until birth, and (2) "person" shall not include the pregnant woman whose unborn child is killed.
(d) This Section shall not apply to acts which cause the death of an unborn child if those acts were committed during any abortion, as defined in Section 2 of the Illinois Abortion Law of 1975, as amended, to which the pregnant woman has consented. This Section shall not apply to acts which were committed pursuant to usual and customary standards of medical practice during diagnostic testing or therapeutic treatment.
(e) The provisions of this Section shall not be construed to prohibit the prosecution of any person under any other provision of law, nor shall it be construed to preclude any civil cause of action.
(Source: P.A. 84‑1414.)

(720 ILCS 5/9‑3.3) (from Ch. 38, par. 9‑3.3)
Sec. 9‑3.3. Drug‑induced homicide.
(a) A person who violates Section 401 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act or Section 55 of the Methamphetamine Control and Community Protection Act by unlawfully delivering a controlled substance to another, and any person's death is caused by the injection, inhalation or ingestion of any amount of that controlled substance, commits the offense of drug‑induced homicide.
(b) Sentence. Drug‑induced homicide is a Class X felony.
(c) A person who commits drug‑induced homicide by violating subsection (a) or subsection (c) of Section 401 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act or Section 55 of the Methamphetamine Control and Community Protection Act commits a Class X felony for which the defendant shall in addition to a sentence authorized by law, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 15 years and not more than 30 years or an extended term of not less than 30 years and not more than 60 years.
(Source: P.A. 94‑556, eff. 9‑11‑05; 94‑560, eff. 1‑1‑06; 95‑331, eff. 8‑21‑07.)


(720 ILCS 5/Art. 10 heading)
ARTICLE 10. KIDNAPING AND RELATED OFFENSES

(720 ILCS 5/10‑1) (from Ch. 38, par. 10‑1)
Sec. 10‑1. Kidnapping.) (a) Kidnapping occurs when a person knowingly:
(1) And secretly confines another against his will, or
(2) By force or threat of imminent force carries another from one place to another with intent secretly to confine him against his will, or
(3) By deceit or enticement induces another to go from one place to another with intent secretly to confine him against his will.
(b) Confinement of a child under the age of 13 years is against his will within the meaning of this Section if such confinement is without the consent of his parent or legal guardian.
(c) Sentence.
Kidnapping is a Class 2 felony.
(Source: P.A. 79‑765.)

(720 ILCS 5/10‑2) (from Ch. 38, par. 10‑2)
Sec. 10‑2. Aggravated kidnaping.
(a) A kidnaper within the definition of paragraph (a) of Section 10‑1 is guilty of the offense of aggravated kidnaping when he:
(1) Kidnaps for the purpose of obtaining ransom from

the person kidnaped or from any other person, or
(2) Takes as his victim a child under the age of 13

years, or a severely or profoundly mentally retarded person, or
(3) Inflicts great bodily harm, other than by the

discharge of a firearm, or commits another felony upon his victim, or
(4) Wears a hood, robe or mask or conceals his

identity, or
(5) Commits the offense of kidnaping while armed

with a dangerous weapon, other than a firearm, as defined in Section 33A‑1 of the "Criminal Code of 1961", or
(6) Commits the offense of kidnaping while armed

with a firearm, or
(7) During the commission of the offense of

kidnaping, personally discharged a firearm, or
(8) During the commission of the offense of

kidnaping, personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused great bodily harm, permanent disability, permanent disfigurement, or death to another person.
As used in this Section, "ransom" includes money, benefit or other valuable thing or concession.
(b) Sentence. Aggravated kidnaping in violation of paragraph (1), (2), (3), (4), or (5) of subsection (a) is a Class X felony. A violation of subsection (a)(6) is a Class X felony for which 15 years shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court. A violation of subsection (a)(7) is a Class X felony for which 20 years shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court. A violation of subsection (a)(8) is a Class X felony for which 25 years or up to a term of natural life shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court.
A person who is convicted of a second or subsequent offense of aggravated kidnaping shall be sentenced to a term of natural life imprisonment; provided, however, that a sentence of natural life imprisonment shall not be imposed under this Section unless the second or subsequent offense was committed after conviction on the first offense.
(Source: P.A. 91‑404, eff. 1‑1‑00; 92‑434, eff. 1‑1‑02.)

(720 ILCS 5/10‑3) (from Ch. 38, par. 10‑3)
Sec. 10‑3. Unlawful restraint.) (a) A person commits the offense of unlawful restraint when he knowingly without legal authority detains another.
(b) Sentence.
Unlawful restraint is a Class 4 felony.
(Source: P.A. 79‑840.)

(720 ILCS 5/10‑3.1) (from Ch. 38, par. 10‑3.1)
Sec. 10‑3.1. Aggravated Unlawful Restraint. (a) A person commits the offense of aggravated unlawful restraint when he knowingly without legal authority detains another while using a deadly weapon.
(b) Sentence. Aggravated unlawful restraint is a Class 3 felony.
(Source: P.A. 84‑930.)

(720 ILCS 5/10‑4) (from Ch. 38, par. 10‑4)
Sec. 10‑4. Forcible Detention.) (a) A person commits the offense of forcible detention when he holds an individual hostage without lawful authority for the purpose of obtaining performance by a third person of demands made by the person holding the hostage, and
(1) the person holding the hostage is armed with a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 33A‑1 of this Code, or
(2) the hostage is known to the person holding him to be a peace officer or a correctional employee engaged in the performance of his official duties.
(b) Forcible detention is a Class 2 felony.
(Source: P.A. 79‑941.)

(720 ILCS 5/10‑5) (from Ch. 38, par. 10‑5)
Sec. 10‑5. Child Abduction.
(a) For purposes of this Section, the following terms shall have the following meanings:
(1) "Child" means a person under the age of 18 or a

severely or profoundly mentally retarded person at the time the alleged violation occurred; and
(2) "Detains" means taking or retaining physical

custody of a child, whether or not the child resists or objects; and
(3) "Lawful custodian" means a person or persons

granted legal custody of a child or entitled to physical possession of a child pursuant to a court order. It is presumed that, when the parties have never been married to each other, the mother has legal custody of the child unless a valid court order states otherwise. If an adjudication of paternity has been completed and the father has been assigned support obligations or visitation rights, such a paternity order should, for the purposes of this Section be considered a valid court order granting custody to the mother.
(b) A person commits child abduction when he or she:
(1) Intentionally violates any terms of a valid

court order granting sole or joint custody, care or possession to another, by concealing or detaining the child or removing the child from the jurisdiction of the court; or
(2) Intentionally violates a court order prohibiting

the person from concealing or detaining the child or removing the child from the jurisdiction of the court; or
(3) Intentionally conceals, detains or removes the

child without the consent of the mother or lawful custodian of the child if the person is a putative father and either: (A) the paternity of the child has not been legally established or (B) the paternity of the child has been legally established but no orders relating to custody have been entered. However, notwithstanding the presumption created by paragraph (3) of subsection (a), a mother commits child abduction when she intentionally conceals or removes a child, whom she has abandoned or relinquished custody of, from an unadjudicated father who has provided sole ongoing care and custody of the child in her absence; or
(4) Intentionally conceals or removes the child from

a parent after filing a petition or being served with process in an action affecting marriage or paternity but prior to the issuance of a temporary or final order determining custody; or
(5) At the expiration of visitation rights outside

the State, intentionally fails or refuses to return or impedes the return of the child to the lawful custodian in Illinois; or
(6) Being a parent of the child, and where the

parents of such child are or have been married and there has been no court order of custody, conceals the child for 15 days, and fails to make reasonable attempts within the 15 day period to notify the other parent as to the specific whereabouts of the child, including a means by which to contact such child, or to arrange reasonable visitation or contact with the child. It is not a violation of this Section for a person fleeing domestic violence to take the child with him or her to housing provided by a domestic violence program; or
(7) Being a parent of the child, and where the

parents of the child are or have been married and there has been no court order of custody, conceals, detains, or removes the child with physical force or threat of physical force; or
(8) Conceals, detains, or removes the child for

payment or promise of payment at the instruction of a person who has no legal right to custody; or
(9) Retains in this State for 30 days a child

removed from another state without the consent of the lawful custodian or in violation of a valid court order of custody; or
(10) Intentionally lures or attempts to lure a child

under the age of 16 into a motor vehicle, building, housetrailer, or dwelling place without the consent of the parent or lawful custodian of the child for other than a lawful purpose.
For the purposes of this subsection (b), paragraph (10), the luring or attempted luring of a child under the age of 16 into a motor vehicle, building, housetrailer, or dwelling place with